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1. Introduction
  Mergers and acqu is i t ions are a form of 
corporate investments. Rational managers 
would go ahead for deals if discounted present 
values of targets are expected to exceed prices 
they finally pay to targets' shareholders (plus 
miscellaneous costs). In real-world situations, 
however, some aspects of observations often 
contradict with implications derived from fully 
rational models. For example, Roll (1986) 
suggests that acquirers' managers are mostly 
optimistic and overconfident in evaluating value 
creation from their deals. Some researches, 
such as Micthell and Mulherin (1996), report 
that mergers and acquisitions have occurred 
in clusters and attribute their causes to non-
fundamental factors (see Shleifer and Vishny 
( 2 003 ) . A l s o , s e e Ha r t f o r d ( 2 005 ) f o r a 
contrary view). It is also documented in Jensen 
and Ruback (1983) that a large fraction of 
gains from mergers and acquisitions accrues 
to shareholders of acquired targets, not those 
of acquirers, which would not have rational 
managers finalize deals.These observations 
suggest that managers are not rational, at 
least to a certain degree. This note proposes 
a model to analyze actual actions of managers 
in mergers and acquisitions in a framework of 
behavioral finance. Behavioral finance assumes 
that managers are not fully rational, at least 
on one occasion or another, and cognitively 
biased in a systematic way (see Baker and 
Wurgler (2007) for a survey of behavioral 
corporate finance). In this note, we provide a 
simple behavioral model to analyze non-rational 
decisions made by managers in mergers and 
acquisitions, which fits observations of real-
world situations more that we would expect in 
rational models.
2. A Model
  We use a model in which a manager maximizes 
fundamental value of a firm and gain from 
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financing. The fundamental value is output 
minus capital invested in production. Output 
is produced with labor L and capital K. The 
manager varies K to maximize the fundamental 
value. Putting aside the fact that mergers and 
acquisitions are lump sum, we model them as 
a continuous variable of investment in K. L 
is fixed so that it is omitted from the model. 
Assuming that the production function f(.) is 
increasing and concave in K, the fundamental 
value is
 f(K) - K
where output is measured in the same unit of K.
  The cognitively biased manager misperceives 
the fundamental value by the degree of λ. The 
misperceived fundamental value is written as
 λ[f(K) - K]
  The manager finances the investment by 
issuing equity or debt . In a ful ly rational 
model, capital structure does not have any 
impact on the firm's value and the manager 
pays no attention to financing decisions. If the 
assumption of rationality is relaxed, however, 
f i nanc ing mat ters so tha t the manager ' s 
perception to valuation of the firm's equity and 
debt in the financial market has consequences 
for his investment and financing decisions.
  The manager misperceives that the firm's 
equity is mispriced in the financial market by a 
factor of γe. Then, the misperceived gain from 
equity financing is
 γee - e
where e is the number of equity newly issued.
  Similarly, the misperceived gain from debt 
financing is
 γbb - b
  where b is the number of debt newly issued.
  Combining all these together, the manager has 
the following objective function：
max λ[f(K) - K] + {γee - e - ce(e)} + {γbb - b - cb(b)}
  where ce(e) and cb(b) are the cost functions of 
issuing equity and debt, respectively.
  We impose a restriction e + b = K, which 
excludes the case that the manager maximizes 
the objective function simply from issuing 
overvalued or repurchasing undervalued equity 
and debt.
  The manager maximizes this with respect K, e, 
and b. The first order conditions are
 λf'(K) + γe - 1 = λ + ce'(e)
 λf'(K) + γb - 1 = λ + cb'(b)
The left-hand sides of the equations are the 
perceived marginal gains from investing in 
K. The right-hand sides are the perceived 
marginal costs of capi ta l investment and 
financing.
3. Implications
  To derive implications from the model, we 
make simplifying assumptions on functional 
form. The production function f(K) is assumed 
to be the Cobb-Douglus function AKα, where 
A i s a s h i f t p a r ame t e r a n d 0 < α < 1 . The 
cost functions ce(e) and cb(b) are assumed to 
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be quadratic, 2we
2 and 2wb
2, where we and wb 
determine the curvature of the cost functions.
With these functional forms, the first-order 
conditions are rewritten as
 λαA(e + b) α-1 + γe - 1 = λ + 2wee
 λαA(e + b) α-1 + γb - 1 = λ + 2wbb
We numerically solve these nonlinear equations 
under some parametric values ( α = 1/3, A = 1 
and we = wb = 1/2) .
  Figure 1 shows how a change in λ affects 
e a n d b ( γ e = γb = 1 ) . S h i f t i n g f r om a b o l d 
to a dotted l ine , λ r ises from 1 to 1 .5 ; the 
manager overvalues returns from mergers 
and acquisitions by 50% while he or she has 
no misperception in financing. e and b both 
increase from 0.0851 to 0.0883 by the same 
proportion. Adding up e and b, K increases 
from 0.1702 to 0.1766 by 3.8%.
  Figure 2 shows how a change in γe affects 
e a n d b ( λ = γ b = 1 ) . S h i f t i n g f r o m a b o l d 
to a dotted l ine, γe rises from 1 to 1.5; the 
manager misperceives that the firm's equity is 
overvalued by 50% in the financial market (the 
figure shows only a dotted line for the second 
equation which remains unchanged after the 
parametric value changes). e rises from 0.0851 
to 0.3688 by 333.4% while b falls from 0.0851 
to -0.01312; the manager buys back outstanding 
debt and replacing them with equity. In total, 
K increases from 0.1702 to 0.2376 by about 
39.6%.
  Figure 3 shows how simultaneous changes in λ, 
γe and γb affect e and b. Shifting from a bold to 
a dotted line, λ, γe and γb all rise from 1 to 1.5. 
e and b both rises from 0.0851 to 0.1444 by the 
same proportion. Summing up, K increase from 
0.1702 to 0.2888 by about 69.7%.
4. Concluding Remarks
  It has been widely observed that mergers 
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and acquisitions occur in clusters when the 
economy is "hot" in booms . This note has 
analyzed a behavioral model that is more in 
line with this observation than rational models. 
The manager's cognitive bias, amplified in 
economic booms, might lead to overvaluations 
to their firsm. This has been illustrated as a 
shift in λ in Figure 1. More importantly, the 
model has implied that their misperceptions in 
their securities, represented as shifts in γe and 
γb in Figure 2, are quantitatively large enough 
to induce them to act without any structural 
changes in industr ies and regulat ions . In 
concluding, a limitation of our analysis should 
be borne in mind. The model has assumed that 
investment is a continuous variable although 
mergers and acquisitions are "discrete". In 
addition, the model is static. These assume 
away a possibility that a manager waits in 
times of financial distress and deals "surge up" 
in booms. Discreteness and dynamics are not 
easily dealt with in this simple framework, and 
should be incorporated in future research.
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